In 1598, no fewer than five Dutch fleets sailed for the East Indies via the eastern route, one of which was commanded by Jacob van Neck. This fleet of eight vessels and a crew of five hundred sixty men sailed from Texel. The fleet reached Java and then the Moluccas, where the Dutch established their first permanent trading companies, and returned to Amsterdam with a cargo of spices in July 1599.

The Dutch trade with the "Spice Islands" via the Cape of Good Hope was now well established. Then the Dutch became even bolder, and decided that same year 1598 to launch two fleets on the track of Magellan via the western route. At that time, only three expeditions had succeeded in circumnavigating the globe, those commanded by Magellan, Drake and Cavendish.

A first fleet commanded by Jacques Mahu was fitted out by merchants who had fled the city of Anvers when it was occupied by the Spanish. This expedition encountered a great deal of bad luck, and only one ship, the LIEFDE under the command of Jacob Quaeckernaeck, reached Japan and the port of Yokohama. Will Adams, the English pilot on this ship, stayed in Japan, took the name of Anjin and became the favorite and advisor on navigation of the shogun Ieyasu, founder of the Tokugawa shogunate.

The other expedition, under the command of Olivier van Noort, experienced an altogether different fate, and accomplished the feat so eagerly anticipated by the Dutch - sailing around the world.

This fleet, financed by merchants in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, consisted of four ships under the command of Olivier van Noort. As was the custom on Dutch expeditions, van Noort himself was an investor in the enterprise, but we do not know exactly why he was appointed admiral of this fleet. His past experience, the profits distributed from his prior expeditions and his connections (his tavern was located on the very elegant market square) certainly had something to do with his appointment by the merchants and by Maurice of Nassau. The latter must certainly have been familiar with him, at least by reputation, because as a stadtholder of the United Netherlands he would certainly have received a percentage of the prizes taken by Olivier van Noort in prior years.

Maurice of Nassau issued letters patent for this mission: "We, Maurice, Prince of Orange, have fitted out these vessels which we are sending to the coasts of Asia, Africa, America and the East lndies to negotiate treaties and to trade with the inhabitants of these regions. But as we have been informed that the Spanish and the Portuguese are hostile to the subjects of our provinces, and are interfering with their navigation and trade in these waters, contrary to all natural rights of cities and nations, we hereby give explicit orders to go to these islands, to resist, to make war, and to strike as many blows as possible against said Spanish and Portuguese".

The 200.000 florins collected by the merchants of Rotterdam and Amsterdam were used to outfit four ships: the MAURITIUS, the 275-ton flagship named after the stadtholder, the HENDRIK FREDERIK, the 350-ton vice flagship named after the third son of William of Nassau, and two smaller ships called "yachts" of approximately 50 tons each, the EENDRACHT (Harmony) and the HOOP. The MAURITIUS had already proved its mettle in 1596 in the capture of Cádiz by the fleet commanded by the Count of Essex, allied with the Dutch and aided by the King of France.

A total of 250 men shipped out with the fleet. The command of the HENDRIK FREDERIK and the title of Vice Admiral were given to Jacob Claesz. Olivier van Noort's fleet left Amsterdam on 13 September 1598 (the very day Philip II died), and stopped first at Plymouth, England, where the Admiral took on as pilot Captain Melis, a former officer under the command of Thomas Cavendish on Cavendish's circumnavigation of the globe from 1586 to 1588. He also signed on a musician named John Calleway, who would play his own role in the adventure.

Van Noort followed the coast of Africa to Principe Island, where a skirmish with the Portuguese resulted in the death of several of his crew, including his brother and his English pilot. He then crossed the Atlantic near the 22nd parallel and made landfall in Brazil. Harrassed incessantly by the Portuguese, the Dutch were unable to land and obtain fresh provisions to relieve the crew which was suffering from scurvy.

Not wishing to take the risk of encountering a Spanish naval force, van Noort decided to cross the Pacific at the latitude of Peru. He made landfall in the Marianas (formerly the Ladrones Islands) in September 1600, and reached the island of Guam, where he

But in the process, he would have to send men ashore and thereby risk revealing his identity. The admiral devised a stratagem. He would pass himself off as French, with a commission from the King of Spain to trade in the colonies. The Dutch went ashore in several longboats to purchase rice, vegetables, fruit and fresh water from the natives.

Olivier van Noort even allowed two Spanish officers, Captain Xirón and Francisco Rodrigo, as well as several Filipinos to board his ship, where he was careful to change the flags and even disguised a sailor as a Catholic priest to lend credibility to the charade. The admiral, who spoke fluent French, easily concealed his true nationality and the purpose of his voyage from the visitors. He persuaded the Filipinos to guide him through the famous and very dangerous San Bernardino Strait, the principal gateway to the archipelago from the Pacific.

The ship weighed anchor after four days of taking on provisions, and stopped at Capul Island, located just at the entrance to the Strait, where some of the crew went ashore. On 19 October, Captain Xirón reported to Manila the arrival of this friendly fleet, and gave an accurate account of the number of men, the ships' guns, weapons and the health of the crew. But the Dutch masquerade came to a sudden end. On 22 October, a Spanish sailor of African descent named Manuel Salvador who had been taken prisoner by the Dutch during the capture of the BUEN JESUS swam to freedom and informed Spanish priests of the fleet's real identity.

On 27 October, his information was confirmed. During a drinking bout on shore, the English musician John Calleway was captured by natives who imprisoned him in a cage and turned him over to the Spanish. Furious, Olivier van Noort looted and burned the native villages, and on 31 October, as noted above, the Audiencia in Manila was informed of the presence of European enemies in the Philippines and of the enemy's actions. Captains Pedro de Arceo, Cobarrubias and Cristóbal de Axqueta were dispatched to Capul by the Audiencia with twenty soldiers armed with harquebuses to oppose the enemy if he attempted to land.

Now that his ruse had been discovered, and having learned the route to Manila, Olivier van Noort cast off. On the way, he captured a Chinese junk loaded with provisions and set sail for the capital. The captain of the junk spoke Portuguese, and with the aid of a Portuguese-speaking member of the crew provided information about Manila, its fortifications and maritime trade. Olivier van Noort also learned that four hundred Chinese junks visited Manila every year between December and April, and that two Japanese junks were to call there shortly.

In the capital, the news of the Dutch fleet aroused concern which was even greater than usual, because the city was practically defenseless. The Spanish army and fleet were away in the southern part of the archipelago on expeditions against the Moorish rebels who were still fiercely resisting any foreign presence. As soon as the Audiencia received the news, it decided to fortify the capital and the arsenal of the port of Cavite in Manila Bay to fend off any enemy attack. It also ordered a fleet readied to pursue the Dutch.

In the port of Cavite there was a trading galleon, the SAN DIEGO, which was awaiting the proper season to return to Acapulco, as well as a small vessel (a patache), the SAN YACINTO, which belonged to a Portuguese trader who had arrived from Malacca, where he had been informed that enemy vessels were approaching the Moluccas. In the shipyards at Cavite, there were also two galleys under construction, as well as a small vessel of about fifty tons which was almost finished. No war ship was available at the time, and the Audiencia resolved to send an official to the site to arm a fleet.

Juan Ronquillo de Castillo, "who was being paid the salary of Captain General of the galleys... although there were no galleys", as Morga spitefully noted in a report to the King, was assigned the task. Ronquillo returned from Cavite three days later, "according to Morga, without having done anything... and furthermore without exhibiting the slightest inclination to do anything. Ronquillo complained about all the problems involved... and claimed so many things were needed that no action was possible". The Governor, at Morga's urging, placed Juan Ronquillo under arrest.

Morga then proposed that he himself be put in charge of preparing the fleet, "to prepare the port, to defend itself and to outfit a fleet, and obtained this appointment from the Audiencia. The Audiencia also appointed Cristóbal Tellez de Almaçan to organize the land defense of Manila. Morga left for Cavite that very day. His organizational talents were put to good use, and he was extremely efficient, working day and night. The shipyard completed the small fifty-ton ship that had been under construction and christened it the SAN BARTOLOME, and the two galleys were readied for launch just as quickly.

Morga requisitioned the San Diego, which was owned by two traders, Luis de Belver and Anton Thomas. It was a merchant galleon of approximately three hundred tons and had been built on the island of Cebu. The SAN DIEGO was fitted for battle, along with the Portuguese patache commanded by Captain Esteban Rodríguez Pérez and the SAN BARTOLOME.

Since the shipyards were unable to provide sufficient artillery, bronze cannon were removed from the forts of Manila. The SAN DIEGO was armed with fourteen bronze cannon, the SAN BARTOLOME with ten, and additional guns were mounted on the Portuguese patache. All the ships were generously supplied with weapons, ammunition and powder by the shipyards, and large quantities of provisions were taken on board. Antonio de Morga, in his enthusiasm, even contributed financially to the operation.

In thirty days, the port of Cavite was prepared to defend itself, and the fleet was almost ready to sail out to meet the enemy. While all this was going on, the Dutch ships had been sitting at the entrance to Manila Bay, plundering with impunity the trading vessels which were sailing for Manila unaware of the danger. The Dutch had captured two junks but were hoping for an even bigger prize. Olivier van Noort had learned from the captain of one of the captured junks that the royal galleon SAN TOMAS was expected in Manila, returning from Acapulco carrying the equivalent in silver pieces of two years income from the NAO DE LA CHINA, i.e. more than one and one-half million pesos. The admiral hoped to take the SAN TOMAS by surprise when it arrived, and the anxiety in Manila was at a fever pitch, because the capture of this galleon by the Dutch would undoubtedly have spelled ruin for the colony.

His task completed, Morga returned to Manila to attend to a matter of extreme importance. An admiral had to be appointed to command the Spanish fleet. Several experienced officers, among them Juan Ronquillo, were perfectly qualified to receive such a command, but Morga saw the occasion as an opportunity in which he could not fail to distinguish himself in the service of the King, under circumstances which were altogether exceptional and even historic. The entire Spanish colony in Manila was aware that a victory would repel the threat for a long time, although a defeat could very easily mean the loss of the Philippines for Spain.

Morga understood this, and realized the advantages he could reap from such a victory. His name would go down in history, and after such service to the Crown, the King would certainly look with favor on his request to be appointed Viceroy of New Spain. Antonio de Morga was not above a bit of scheming to obtain the appointment he wanted so desperately. To general astonishment, he claimed that he had fought for his King in naval battles in Spain, although he was careful not to confirm any of these claims in writing which, of course, no one was in any position to verify.

He also undertook a campaign to rally support for his appointment among those who might hope for favors in the future. The governor could not enter into open conflict with Morga, who might very well be the next governor of the Philippines and who therefore had to be handled with care. Tello gave in and appointed Morga admiral of the fleet in great secrecy. The order from the Audiencia announcing this appointment was not even countersigned by the other oidores.

Antonio de Morga departed immediately for Cavite, leaving a letter to the governor asking him not to announce his appointment publicly until the fleet had sailed. In Manila, the news spread quickly nonetheless, arousing indignation among the superior officers. In an attempt to appease them, the governor appointed Juan de Alcega captain of the SAN BARTOLOME and Vice Admiral of the fleet, which mortified Morga, because Alcega, after his arrest the previous year, had become Morga 's mortal enemy. Moreover, Alcega's long experience in naval warfare would only emphasize the admiral's inexperience.

Boarding began on Monday 11 December. The officers, crew and soldiers were divided between the SAN DIEGO and the SAN BARTOLOME. Morga took the SAN DIEGO as his flagship, and brought on board an impressive number of soldiers and mercenaries. To their number were added the crew and one hundred fifty nobles and officers from the flower of the Spanish aristocracy in Manila, as well as three clergymen. There must have been more than four hundred fifty people on the SAN DIEGO, a very large contingent considering the size of the ship.

A priest, Father Juan de Gutiérrez, left a lively account of the mobilization, marveling at the magnificent uniforms of the officers and soldiers and their shining weapons - shields, armor, coats of mail and golden helmets decorated with feather plumes. He compares these soldiers to the army of Don Juan of Austria, which he had accompanied in his youth at the Battle of Lepanto. Finally, he notes that, touchingly, all these proud soldiers devoted essentially the entire day on Monday to religion because, he says, they were impatient to meet the enemy, and asked the priests to give them "the real Spanish weapons, which are confession and communion." All the soldiers took confession and communion until late in the night from three Augustinian friars, one Jesuit and two Dominicans.

The fleet, consisting of the two ships supported by two smaller native vessels which carried Chinese soldiers, put to sea on 12 December 1600, in rather good weather but with a cool wind from the northeast. Morga had received orders to make contact as soon as possible with the enemy ships which, it was known, were near the entrance to Manila Bay, to engage them in battle before they could escape, and to destroy or sink the pirates. If the enemy vessels escaped, Morga would have to pursue them to the Strait of Malacca - through which the enemy ships would have to pass in any case. In that case, the admiral would have to wait for the southwest monsoon, i.e. until June, to return.

Having received these secret orders, Morga therefore resolved to surprise the enemy. He certainly had no desire to spend several months at sea. Sentinels on land had informed him that the two Dutch vessels had anchored for the evening near a point which at the time was called Point Ballestégui, now called Fire Point, near Manila Bay. Antonio de Morga decided to spend the night in the small port of the island of Mariveles at the entrance to the bay. The fleet put in during the day on 13 December to prepare its battle plan. Morga sent written orders to Captain Alcega specifying, among other things, that his ship must sail in convoy with the flagship, and follow it on its route. The SAN BARTOLOME was then to come alongside the enemy flagship at the same time as the SAN DIEGO, and join forces during the battle.

From this point on, we have two different versions of what happened. Antonio de Morga's version - which is faithfully echoed by Governor Francisco Tello - was presented in various reports to the King of Spain, and is extremely detailed with regard to the preparations, but rather vague when it comes to the description of the naval battle itself. This oft-repeated account, which has been reprinted in many books, became the official and accepted version of the dramatic events which were to follow. The other version is revealed to us by documents which were kept secret at the time, and which, almost four centuries later, awaited close study in the archives of the Casa de Contratación in Seville. They re-establish the truth of what really happened on this famous day which decided the fate of the Philippines, and became known to history as the "Dutchman's Day".

The events are described as follows in the various reports from Morga and the Governor: The fleet, which had been anchored in the port of the island of Mariveles, set sail at dawn on 14 December in a strong wind and a rather heavy sea. Shortly after sunrise, the two Dutch ships were spotted anchored near a small island called Anasugbu not far from the entrance to the bay. The SAN DIEGO approached the Dutch flagship, fired on it, came alongside and engaged in fierce combat.

Captain Alcega, disregarding the admiral's orders, did not come alongside the MAURITIUS, but pursued the EENDRACHT which fled southward. The pitched battle between the SAN DIEGO and the MAURITIUS lasted six hours. Antonio de Morga was in the heat of the action for the entire time. As he tells it: The oidor, from the deck of his flagship, inspired those around him and hastened everywhere his presence was required. Around 2:00 PM, a leak was discovered on the SAN DIEGO, probably caused by the fact that this merchant ship, which was not designed for naval combat, had been damaged by the numerous cannonballs it had taken during the battle.

Suddenly a fire broke out on the MAURITIUS. The Spanish admiral then decided to cut the moorings which held the SAN DIEGO to the Dutch vessel, with the intention of beaching his ship on Fortune Island, approximately two leagues from the site of the battle, to save his crew and guns. After it cast loose, the SAN DIEGO sailed several hundred meters toward this small island and sank suddenly, taking its armed contingent with it. In spite of the pleas of an officer who cried, Save yourself, Your Grace, the ship is sinking!, the admiral was the last to jump into the water, and swam for more than four hours, carrying in his arms the two standards captured from the enemy. About one hundred men survived and managed to escape the Dutch lances, cannon and harquebus fire. The Dutch extinguished the fire on their ship and escaped. The survivors reached the shore of the small desert island called Fortune.

But this account of the first naval battle between two European powers in the Philippines was challenged by Juan de Alcega and various others in Manila. Morga and the Governor felt it necessary to send the King numerous additional letters and reports, all of which basically repeated this version of events.

Olivier van Noort, who ultimately escaped and completed his voyage around the world, also related a version in which, wishing to portray his exploits in the most favorable light, he spoke of a six-hour pitched battle between the Dutch and Spanish on that memorable day. In 1602, he published his account in a book entitled "Description of the Arduous Voyage (...)", which enjoyed a certain success.

Antonio de Morga, who was familiar with van Noort's book, described the battle without significantly altering his initial account in a history of the Philippines entitled "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas". This remarkable work, which contains a surprising amount of information on the political, human and social history of the Philippines, circulated for years in the form of manuscript copies before Morga finally had it printed in Mexico in 1609. To this day, it remains a valuable reference work on the period. Numerous works published over the centuries repeated this "official" version of the battle, and the protests of Morga's detractors were forgotten.

In studying the numerous reports and correspondence in my possession, I was first struck by an inconsistency which would have to be resolved before we would be able to identify the area where the SAN DIEGO went down. In all his reports, letters, and even in his book, Morga writes that the SAN DIEGO sank one and one-half leagues, or sometimes two leagues, from Fortune Island. At that time, however, there were several different types of leagues: the English league, the French league and the Portuguese league, not to mention the Spanish long and short leagues. Even if we take the shortest league as a reference, and use the smallest number given by Morga, namely one and one-half leagues, we still get a distance of eight kilometers between the site of the shipwreck and Fortune Island, which is inconsistent with the fact that the naval battle took place between the island of Anasugbu, near the coast of Luzon, and Fortune Island. These two pieces of land are separated by a channel which is only ten kilometers wide. Why then did the survivors have to swim eight kilometers to reach Fortune Island, when the coast of Luzon was only two kilometers away? The fact that Morga swam for four hours carrying in his arms the standards captured from the enemy assuredly represents remarkable swimming prowess in a rather rough sea, although we can be forgiven for suspecting that the narrator is indulging in a slight exaggeration. And although Morga speaks of one and one-half leagues in his initial report, his book gives the distance as two leagues. Morga had an obvious and only human desire to glorify his exploits, so his estimates of distances are not very reliable.

Another obscure point in all the reports concerns the exact circumstances of the sinking. Why were almost all the Spanish still on board the SAN DIEGO when it went down? And how were the fifty-nine Dutch sailors, who must have been weakened after their long voyage, able to fight off the three hundred fifty armed men and officers on the SAN DIEGO for several hours? Olivier van Noort says that once the mooring lines were cut, the Spanish flagship sank almost immediately. It seemed very strange to me that the Spanish soldiers who (according to Morga) had been fighting on the deck of the MAURITIUS for six hours would have returned to the SAN DIEGO, only to go down with it a few seconds later.

Since the documents in my possession did not answer all these questions, I thought it wise to continue our investigation in the archives before undertaking a physical search solely on the basis of Morga 's account, of which the Governor's report and the later second-hand accounts are really only variants.

Patrick Lizé went back in search of unpublished manuscripts, as well as undiscovered letters from witnesses or reports concerning this "Dutchman's Day". One day he returned from Spain with new documents which turned out to be real treasures. In Madrid he had found a memoir by the Jesuit priest Alonso Bernal, who was on board the SAN BARTOLOME, as well as a handwritten account by Father Chirino, in the San Cugat Monastery in Barcelona. Father Chirino claimed to have heard Alonso Gómez Hombra, the pilot who survived the sinking of the SAN DIEGO, say that the ship went down only one-half league from Fortune Island, and not two leagues as claimed by Morga!

In fact, these documents seriously undermine Morga's version. The most important find was a fat file containing the records of the interrogation of witnesses which Patrick had discovered in the archives of the Casa de Contratación in Seville. Unlike all the other accounts by Antonio de Morga, the Governor, Alcega, Olivier van Noort and the priests who were present at the battle, this newly-discovered document had never been printed or even copied. It consists of depositions taken in Manila from survivors of the battle which date from 10 January 1601, i.e. less than one month after the event.

The depositions were taken by Cristóbal Tellez de Almaçan and Gerónimo de Salazar Salcedo, and were transcribed by Luis de Contreras, Secretary of the Audiencia. Twentytwo witnesses were questioned, the last one on 12 June 12 1601. As I deciphered the pages of the precious manuscript, I grew increasingly perplexed. The events described were completely different from what was reported in all the official and printed texts. The number and diversity of the witnesses - cabin boys, a page, sailors, a surgeon, soldiers, sergeants, captains, a secretary, a cooper, gunners - as well as the consistency of their accounts, left no doubt as to their veracity. It seemed highly unlikely to me that these depositions were collected as part of apolitical conspiracy against Antonio de Morga.

Inspired by these accounts, I worked straight through for two days and two nights. I finally understood what actually happened. The obscure points became clear. Everything became coherent, and through these colorful and sometimes quite spicy accounts, I relived with intensity the events of that memorable day. Although some of the witnesses such as Antonio Rodríguez, a 31-year-old sailor, and Cristóbal Vicente, a 15-year-old page, were illiterate and did not sign their depositions, they express themselves very clearly and have no interest in concealing anything. Many of the witnesses do not even know exactly how old they are, but their memories are very clear, and they include even the tiniest details.

Particularly interesting and consistent are the accounts given by Juan Romero, a 16-year-old cabin boy, Juan de Santiago, a 25-year-old soldier, Miguel de Estrada, a 35-year-old surgeon, Pedro Pinto de Almeida, a 37-year-old officer and Gaspar Pérez, a 20-year-old captain. Here then, thanks to these survivors of the wreck, is the surprising story of the battle of the SAN DIEGO, corroborated by the testimony of Olivier van Noort and Juan de Alcega.

As they weighed anchor on the morning of 12 December 1600, the crew and the men-at-arms of the SAN DIEGO were uneasy because the admiral had ordered all the men to board his flagship, although the Portuguese patache SAN JACINTOS was to have taken a certain number of them. Obviously, Antonio de Morga seemed to think that he would need such a large number of soldiers to have the advantage over the enemy.

To make matters worse, the fleet had not sailed under the best auspices, because many officers and soldiers had defected and had to be recaptured or replaced by mercenaries. The reason for these defections was uncertain, but it seems that many of the desertions were the result of Morga 's appointment as admiral.

There had also been acts of sabotage during the preparations. As it sailed out of the port of Cavite, the SAN DIEGO, which was improperly ballasted, rolled gunwales under, overloaded as it was with an impressive number of chicken coops, crates, jars, trunks and beds. The number of men on board seemed to make any long-term pursuit of the Dutch ships a questionable proposition. "Counting the Spanish, Filipinos, Japanese and Africans, there must have been five hundred people." Indescribable chaos reigned, and Antonio de Morga, unaccustomed to shipboard command, was unable to gain control of the situation. He gave no orders to his officers.

In the morning, Captain Alcega recommended to the admiral that he add ballast to his ship to improve its balance, considering the heavy artillery he had taken on board, but Morga ignored the advice. The fleet left the port of Mariveles that evening. Alcega dispatched a sampan full of ballast stones to the SAN DIEGO, but Morga refused to take on any more ballast. First, of course, he would have had to unload all the trunks full of personal effects and the numerous jars of provisions. That would take too much time, and the Dutch, who might have been warned of the approach of a Spanish fleet, might escape.

Morga, we know, wanted to engage the enemy as quickly as possible. Morga also disregarded the advice of Luis de Belver, the owner of the vessel, who accompanied the expedition. "Captain Luis de Belver told Dr. Morga that the ship was very light, and that it would only sail properly if it was carrying a lot of ballast. He also recommended unloading the crates and the beds and leaving them on shore. Not only did Morga ignore this advice, but on the contrary, he ordered Captain Ordiales to place all those items below decks, where they took up practically the entire hold." The crew of the SAN DIEGO had to sleep on the forecastle, because there was no more room for them below decks.

The departure was set for the next morning at dawn. But in the middle of the night, the SAN DIEGO sailed without informing the SAN BARTOLOME, although Morga 's orders specified that the two ships were to leave the port of Mariveles in convoy. All the witnesses are clear on this fact, and Alcega himself tells us that his lookout saw the SAN DIEGO leaving the port. Alcega therefore left more than one hour behind Morga, and the SAN DIEGO lurched and yawed dangerously.

"The ship listed to the point where everyone had to move to the windward side and throw the cooking stoves overboard." By daybreak, the Dutch ships were in sight. Olivier van Noort, for his part, saw immediately that the Spanish had sent an entire fleet against his two ships. He therefore decided to reinforce the crew of the MAURITIUS with men from the EENDRACHT, and devised a tactic.

He sent his longboat to the EENDRACHT to transfer men to his ship, and ordered his vice admiral to flee while he and his ship delayed the Spanish fleet. The EENDRACHT's mission was to return to Holland with the valuable information it had collected about the Spanish trade and defenses.

The MAURITIUS took up a battle position to engage the SAN DIEGO, which arrived well ahead of the SAN BARTOLOME, while the EENDRACHT attempted to escape downwind. As soon as it was within range of its guns, the MAURITIUS fired a salvo which damaged the SAN DIEGO. The Spanish admiral gave the order to return fire, but nothing happened. "Dr. Morga asked a gunner which guns were ready to fire. He answered, "All of them". Morga then gave the order to fire. The gunner replied that he could not fire any of them, because the ship was too crowded, and because water was coming in through the gun ports."

Morga responded by ordering the gunner to "Do what you can ", then ordered the crew to return fire with a small gun which was on the deck. During this time, the MAURITIUS fired a second salvo which also hit its target. The skill of the Dutch gunners was obvious. The situation of the Spanish galleon became critical. Some of its rigging and a bilge pump had been destroyed, and there had been several fatalities.

A small gun on the SAN DIEGO fired a ball which landed in the water between the two ships. Morga, judging his position very precarious, then ordered the SAN DIEGO to pull alongside at about 8:00 AM, without waiting for the arrival of the SAN BARTOLOME. The master asked him to trim the sails, as was the custom for such a maneuver, but Morga insisted that the sails should not be trimmed, and the SAN DIEGO rammed the MAURITIUS at full speed. The MAURITIUS lurched under the force of the impact. The grappling irons were launched with cries of "Death to the dogs!", and the SAN DIEGO's starboard anchors were used to hold the MAURITIUS.

The Spanish then lowered the canvas curtain which had concealed the deck of the SAN DIEGO from enemy view. At the sight of three hundred men-at-arms lined up on the deck of the Spanish galleon, the Dutch, of whom there were only fifty-nine, fired a few shots from their harquebuses and took cover. Some thirty Spaniards leapt onto the deck of the Dutch vessel. The cabin boy Juan Romero recounted that he climbed the mast and captured the blue, white and orange standard of the House of Orange-Nassau. Another sailor captured the colors from the stern and the Spanish flag was raised over the MAURITIUS. The soldiers returned to the SAN DIEGO to make their report and to deliver the standards taken from the enemy as trophies to Antonio de Morga.

Imagine their surprise when they found the admiral, pale and prostrate, lying on the deck near the capstan, surrounded by a mattress made of kapok for protection! They gave him the standards and awaited their orders. The admiral said nothing. "Doctor Morga should then have ordered our crew to leap onto the deck of the enemy flagship and complete its capture. But I saw that he gave no orders and said nothing, because he was quite pale, almost unconscious and discouraged. I then told him that he should order the men to board the enemy ship! He replied, 'But what can I do?' At that point, everyone who saw him was discouraged!"

A sailor splashed water in Morga's face to bring him around. On deck, three hundred men armed to the teeth awaited the order to pursue the Dutch below decks. The Dutch saw that they were hopelessly outnumbered and offered through the open portholes to surrender in exchange for their lives. The message was delivered to Antonio de Morga, but he remained petrified and prostrate on his mattress.

While all this was going on, Juan de Alcega had caught up with the SAN DIEGO. As ordered, he sailed around to the other side of the MAURITIUS and fired his guns at close range. At this point, the few Spanish on the deck of the MAURITIUS, including Sergeant-Major Mansilla and Gregorio de Vargas Albarráin, as well as other soldiers, asked the SAN BARTOLOME to hold its fire, because the enemy ship had been taken. "Cease fire, we are friends!" and everyone yelled "Spain, Spain, Victory, Victory! They have surrendered!"

Morga's private secretary Naveda called from the SAN DIEGO that the ship now belonged to the King of Spain, and that the SAN BARTOLOME was to hold its fire and pursue the EENDRACHT, which at that point was more than two leagues from the battle zone. Alcega followed orders, but of course, he could hardly wait for written confirmation of these orders, even though they were contrary to the written instructions Morga had given him the evening before.

Since he was leeward of the MAURITIUS and the SAN DIEGO, it took him some time to maneuver clear of the battle site and pursue the EENDRACHT. The Dutch, who had been begging for mercy, now became somewhat circumspect, because contrary to all their expectations, no one had tried to flush them from their cover. The hours dragged on, as officer after officer pleaded with Morga to give the order to attack the Dutch who had retrenched below decks. Morga, prostrate, remained silent. From time to time, the Dutch ventured on deck to fire a few musket rounds at the Spanish. Five hours after boarding, the Spanish soldiers had not pursued their advantage.

An uproar suddenly swept the SAN DIEGO. A major leak had been discovered in the hold; the water was flooding in and had almost reached the lower deck. Men were already drowning in the holds! The leak had been caused by the violent impact of the ramming, or by gun ports which had been left open while the SAN DIEGO was listing, or possibly by a Dutch cannonball fired at the water line. The surgeon came on deck to announce that it was impossible to locate the leak, let alone repair it, because of the indescribable chaos in the holds, which were so crowded that there was no room to even move.

The surgeon himself had no room to care for the wounded. Morga, once again, could do no more than advise him to "Do what you can". The chief gunner came on deck to plead with Morga, who did not react. Finally a sergeant came to urge the admiral to act, also to no avail. For their part, the superior officers did not dare to take the initiative, and left Morga to face his responsibilities by himself.

The Dutch took courage from the confusion on the enemy ship. Olivier van Noort then tried a well-known sailor's ruse. He deliberately set fire to his own ship to force his men to come on deck to fight, and also, of course, to frighten the Spanish. Dense smoke poured out of the MAURITIUS, and the SAN DIEGO, moored to it, was caught in a dilemma. If the SAN DIEGO remained moored to the Dutch ship, it would burn; if it cast off, it would sink.

That was when Morga roused himself somewhat and ordered the lines cut! Diego de Santiago, a Jesuit priest, stupefied by such an order, told the admiral that he would first have to finish taking the enemy ship and transfer all his men to it before executing such a maneuver, because once cut loose, the SAN DIEGO would sink like a stone. Then, crucifix in hand, he exhorted the men to fight. "Christians! Spaniards! Where is your courage? Your cause is God's cause! Die! Die like good soldiers of Jesus Christ! Don't let yourself be eaten by fish! See that we are threatened by two evils, and the lesser is to board the enemy ship, because even if we lose our ship, we will win another!"

But Morga, still not entirely lucid, repeated the fatal order to cast off the lines mooring the ships together. The Spanish had problems cutting loose from the MAURITIUS under fire from the Dutch, who then went on the offensive. When the lines had finally been cut, the SAN DIEGO sailed about two hundred meters toward the small island of Fortune, nosed over and went straight to the bottom. "When they finally separated from us, some short [sic] time later, we saw her sink like a stone."

Bibliography and Sources:

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Goddio, Franck. Treasures of the San Diego. Catalogue of traveling exhibition of finds of the San Diego.

Goddio, Franck. San Diego. An Account of Adventure, Deceit, and Intrigue. National Geographic, July, 1994

Mollema, J.C. De Nederlandsche vlag op de wereldzeeën. Ontdekkingsreizen onzer voorouders. Amsterdam.

Posthumus Meyjes, R. Geschiedkundige Atlas van Nederland. De eerste reizen der Nederlanders, naar de bijbehorende kaart en aangeduide landen en eilanden. 's-Gravenhage, 1924

Boer, M.G de. Van Oude Voyagiën. Amsterdam, 1923, 1979

Commelin, Izaäk. Begin ende voortgangh van de Nederlantsche geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie. Vervattende de voornaemste reysen bij de inwoonderen derselver provinciën derwaerts gedaan. Amsterdam, 1646

Dam, Pieter van. (ed. by F.W. Stapel and C.W.Th. van Boetzelaer.) Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie. 's-Gravenhage, 1977